2. Geopolitical challenges in Maritime Zones: selected case studies

Maritime zones have become critical arenas of geopolitical tension and strategic competition in the 21st century. As global trade, energy flows, and digital infrastructure increasingly rely on secure and navigable sea routes, certain maritime areas, such as chokepoints, enclosed seas, and resource-rich regions, have gained unprecedented geopolitical significance. This chapter explores key case studies where access, control, and sovereignty over maritime spaces intersect with broader regional and global power rivalries.

From the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and the strategic role of submarine cables, these examples illustrate how maritime geography is shaping the global order.

#1. Tensions and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region

Dimension Tensions and Rivalries Cooperation and Initiatives
Geostrategic Presence - Competition among regional (India, China) and extra-regional powers (USA, UK, France) - Joint naval exercises and multilateral dialogue forums
Territorial Claims - Disputes over islands and EEZs: Chagos Archipelago (UK/Mauritius), Scattered Islands & Tromelin (France/Mauritius) - Peaceful dispute resolution efforts through UN resolutions and bilateral agreements
China–India Rivalry - BRI and “String of Pearls” viewed as encirclement of India - India's strategic partnerships (e.g., with France) and enhanced military presence
Military Expansion - US base in Diego Garcia, Chinese-funded ports, Indian military bases - Anti-piracy naval cooperation and maritime security partnerships
Environmental Pressure - Resource extraction, pollution, illegal fishing, plastic gyres - Initiatives promoting the Blue Economy, regulated seabed mining, marine conservation efforts
Economic Inequality - Strong HDI disparities: LDCs (Mozambique, Comoros) vs. BRICS (India, South Africa) - Economic integration via IORA, SADC, SAARC, GCC, ASEAN
Digital Infrastructure - Strategic competition over submarine cables and telecom dominance (e.g., Huawei’s digital Silk Road) - Growing connectivity and infrastructure financing by various international actors
Anti-piracy and Security - Piracy threats around Horn of Africa - Joint operations: EU’s Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Shield, China-led missions
Humanitarian Action - Fragile states and conflict-prone areas (e.g., Yemen, Somalia) - UN, EU, and Indian-led humanitarian relief efforts in crisis zones

#2. South China Sea

#A. Description

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed marginal sea that forms part of the Pacific Ocean. It is located in Southeast Asia, bordered by China to the north, Vietnam to the west, the Philippines to the east, and Malaysia and Brunei to the south. The sea is connected to the East China Sea through the Taiwan Strait to the northeast. And it is connected to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca to the southwest, making it a critical junction between two of the world’s most important maritime regions.

Covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometres, the South China Sea is one of the world’s most heavily trafficked waterways. It includes several marginal seas such as the Luzon Strait, and a number of island groups, most notably the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, which are largely uninhabited but the subject of intense territorial disputes.

Despite its vast area, the South China Sea has very limited naturally emerged land, consisting mostly of small islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals. Many of these features are submerged or only visible at low tide, making sovereignty claims particularly complex under international maritime law.

The region is not only vital for global maritime trade and energy transit, but also rich in natural resources, including fish stocks and potential hydrocarbon reserves beneath the seabed. Its strategic position, combined with competing territorial claims, has made the South China Sea a major flashpoint in regional and global geopolitics.

#B. Strategic importance of the South China Sea

#a) A vital global trade route

The South China Sea is one of the most strategically important maritime spaces in the world due to its role in facilitating global trade. It carries around half of the world’s maritime trade in goods, connecting the seven largest container ports, most of which are located on China’s coastline, with international markets. In addition, one-third of the world’s oil shipments pass through this region, making it indispensable for global energy flows.

#b) A resource-rich maritime space

Beyond its role as a trade route, the South China Sea is rich in resources, both in terms of fisheries and hydrocarbons. It supports vital fishing grounds and is believed to hold significant reserves of oil and natural gas, particularly in contested zones like the areas around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This has intensified competition for access and control over EEZs in the region.

#C. Chinese territorial strategy in the South China Sea

#a) Sovereignty through artificial expansion: island-building and militarisation

China’s maritime ambitions in the South China Sea are driven by a desire to expand its EEZ and to assert sovereignty over a strategically vital, resource-rich area. This ambition is supported by a broader strategy that combines militarisation, economic investment, and territorial appropriation to reinforce its presence across disputed waters.

The region contains very little naturally emerged land, less than 13 km² at high tide, scattered across hundreds of reefs, rocks, and atolls. To bolster its claims, China has engaged in extensive land reclamation, particularly in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. This process, known as polderisation, has transformed previously submerged features into artificial islands equipped with military infrastructure.

One of the most notable examples is Fiery Cross Reef. Occupied by China since 1988, the reef was significantly expanded between 2014 and 2017. It now hosts a 3,100-metre runway, a deepwater port, missile systems, and a heliport, turning a once modest coral outcrop into a major air and naval base. The expansion reflects China's broader policy of creating a physical and strategic footprint in the region, often referred to by Western observers as a "Great Wall of Sand."

In the Paracel Islands, the PRC has similarly expanded its control through reclamation and militarisation. The archipelago lies around 375 km from Vietnam and 300 km from China’s Hainan Island. Despite overlapping claims from Vietnam, China now occupies about 20 islands and has established a small civilian population to reinforce its claim. These installations include ports, airstrips, and military facilities that support China's growing maritime presence.

#b) A strategy of fait accompli

China’s approach is based on a strategy of incremental appropriation, often referred to as a strategy of fait accompli. Through the creation of artificial islands, the deployment of fishing fleets, and the support of maritime militias, China systematically builds facts on the ground. In 2021, for instance, 220 Chinese fishing vessels were reported anchored near Julian Felipe Reef, demonstrating the use of civilian proxies in contested zones. These actions are supported by the Chinese coast guard, which operates over 130 large vessels and has been granted expanded powers to confront foreign ships since 2021.

Military posturing complements these efforts, with foreign warships frequently shadowed or challenged in contested waters. China also reinforces its claims through administrative and legal measures, including the creation of governance structures for the Spratlys and Paracels, and through soft-power tools such as scientific research campaigns, marine environmental initiatives like BlueSea 2020, and even organised tourism to disputed islets.

#c) Strategic anchoring via the Belt and Road Initiative

The South China Sea also plays a critical role in the maritime component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has focused on developing ports and logistics hubs across key locations in the Indo-Pacific. Many of these investments, though presented as commercial, have strategic significance, providing potential access points for the Chinese navy and extending Beijing’s influence well beyond its coast.

Tensions between China and the Philippines reached a legal turning point in 2013, when the Philippines filed a case against China before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. The case challenged the legality of China’s extensive claims under the Nine-Dash Line at the time, particularly its encroachments into the Philippines’ EEZ, including areas such as Scarborough Shoal and parts of the Spratly Islands.

In July 2016, the PCA issued a landmark ruling in favour of the Philippines. The tribunal concluded that China’s claims based on historic rights had no legal basis under UNCLOS, and that its artificial island-building had caused severe environmental damage to coral reefs. The court also reaffirmed the rights of the Philippines to exploit resources within its EEZ.

However, China refused to participate in the proceedings and has rejected the tribunal’s ruling, continuing its activities in the contested areas. Beijing has insisted that the dispute must be resolved bilaterally, outside of international legal frameworks. In practice, it has intensified its presence in Philippine-claimed waters, through both military and civilian means, further escalating regional tensions.

This case illustrates the limits of international law when confronted with power politics, and highlights the challenges faced by smaller nations in asserting maritime rights against a major regional power. The Philippines’ legal success has had limited practical effect, but it remains a critical reference point for ongoing and future disputes in the South China Sea.

#e) The Ten-Dash Line and rejection of international norms

China’s claims are encapsulated in the “Ten-Dash Line”, an expanded version of the former Nine-Dash Line, that asserts sweeping sovereignty over nearly the entire South China Sea. These claims are not recognised under international law, particularly the UNCLOS, which rejects historical usage as a valid basis for territorial claims. Nevertheless, China continues to enforce its position, posing a major challenge to international norms of maritime governance and to freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most crucial waterways.

#3. The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic maritime zone

#A. A unique maritime space

#a) Location and physical characteristics

The Persian Gulf is a semi-enclosed sea located between the Arabian Peninsula and the Iranian plateau, forming a central maritime space in the Middle East. It is bordered by eight countries: Iran to the north; Iraq and Kuwait to the northwest; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the west and southwest, and Oman to the southeast, where it controls part of the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

The gulf stretches approximately 1,200 kilometres in length and remains relatively shallow and narrow, factors that shape both its ecological conditions and navigational routes. At its eastern extremity lies the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint only 45 kilometres wide at its narrowest. This strait serves as the only exit from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the broader Indian Ocean, making it one of the most strategically significant waterways for international maritime trade, especially in hydrocarbons.

#b) Natural and environmental features

The Persian Gulf is characterised by an arid desert climate, marked by extremely high temperatures, minimal rainfall, and intense evaporation rates. These conditions contribute to the gulf’s hypersaline waters, particularly in its shallower coastal zones, where salinity levels far exceed those of most other marine environments. Despite its harsh climatic profile, the gulf sustains a rich and diverse marine ecosystem, including coral reefs, mangroves, and numerous fish species that support local economies.

However, this ecological richness is coupled with significant environmental vulnerability. The region’s fragile habitats are increasingly threatened by industrial pollution, coastal development, oil spills, and the broader impacts of climate change, including rising sea temperatures and acidification. These pressures place considerable strain on the gulf's capacity to maintain ecological balance and biodiversity.

#B. An energy hub of global significance

#a) Hydrocarbon wealth and export infrastructure

The Persian Gulf is home to some of the most significant concentrations of hydrocarbon resources globally, containing over 50 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and approximately 40 percent of known natural gas reserves. This geological endowment has positioned the region as a cornerstone of the global energy economy. Since the 1950s, the exploitation of these resources has driven rapid economic transformation among the Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The region hosts major oil and gas export terminals such as Jebel Ali in Dubai and the terminals in Abu Dhabi, which facilitate the large-scale maritime export of crude oil and liquefied natural gas. To mitigate risks associated with maritime chokepoints, several countries have also developed pipeline networks that allow hydrocarbons to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, such as the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia and the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline in the UAE, enhancing the strategic flexibility of their energy infrastructure.

#b) Maritime transport and chokepoint dynamics

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical maritime chokepoints in the world, with approximately one third of global oil trade, equivalent to around 20 million barrels per day, transiting its narrow waters. This immense volume underscores the global strategic dependency on the safe and uninterrupted navigation of this corridor, which links the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean.

The geopolitical sensitivity of the strait is heightened by its vulnerability to regional tensions, particularly those involving Iran, which lies along its northern shore. In response to the potential for conflict or blockades, Gulf states have invested in alternative transport infrastructures to reduce their reliance on this single maritime passage. Notably, Saudi Arabia operates the East West Pipeline to the Red Sea, while the United Arab Emirates has developed the Habshan to Fujairah pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi’s oil fields to a port on the Gulf of Oman. These measures aim to ensure continuity in energy exports and enhance the resilience of global supply chains.

#C. A hotspot of geopolitical and environmental tension

#a) Regional rivalries and military presence

The Persian Gulf is a focal point of intense geopolitical rivalry, primarily shaped by the longstanding ideological and strategic antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While Iran positions itself as the leader of the Shi'a Muslim world, Saudi Arabia claims pre-eminence among Sunni Arab states, and acts as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. This sectarian and political rivalry manifests most visibly in their competition for regional influence, often played out through proxy conflicts and maritime posturing.

The Strait of Hormuz, in particular, has become a flashpoint for military friction, with frequent naval manoeuvres and incidents involving the seizure or harassment of oil tankers. The strategic vulnerability of this maritime corridor has led to a robust international naval presence, notably the United States Navy, which maintains a permanent deployment in the region. Other global powers, including the United Kingdom, France and increasingly China, have also established naval facilities or strategic partnerships in the area, underscoring the gulf’s significance in global security architecture.

#b) Global implications and shifting alliances

The Persian Gulf’s geopolitical significance extends far beyond the region, as global powers deepen their strategic alignments to secure energy access and influence regional dynamics. The United States has long maintained a close military and economic partnership with Saudi Arabia, underpinned by shared strategic interests and energy security.

In contrast, China has cultivated a robust relationship with Iran, marked by economic cooperation and a 25-year strategic agreement signed in 2021. A key dimension of China’s growing footprint in the region is its development of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship project within the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Situated on the Arabian Sea near the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar provides China with direct maritime access to the Persian Gulf region, enabling the overland transport of oil and goods to western China via pipelines and highways. This route bypasses the vulnerable Strait of Malacca and enhances China’s strategic autonomy in energy logistics. Beyond infrastructure, China has expanded its economic and diplomatic presence across the Gulf, investing in ports, renewable energy, and industrial zones, while also playing an emerging role as mediator, most notably in facilitating the 2023 diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Symbolic of the region’s geopolitical sensitivities is the enduring naming dispute over the gulf itself: while Iran insists on the historic name "Persian Gulf", the Arab monarchies prefer the term "Arabian Gulf", and some compromise with "Arabian-Persian Gulf", reflecting broader contestations over identity, heritage, and territorial legitimacy.

#c) Environmental and climatic threats

The Persian Gulf region faces mounting environmental and climatic challenges that threaten both human habitation and ecological sustainability. Climate projections suggest that, by 2070, parts of the Gulf coastline could become uninhabitable due to extreme heat combined with high humidity, potentially exceeding thresholds for human survival. This scenario is particularly concerning given the region’s dense coastal urbanisation and economic dependence on maritime activity. Although the Gulf states remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels, some have begun to embrace renewable energy as part of long-term adaptation and diversification strategies. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has launched significant solar power projects and hosted the COP28 climate summit in 2023, positioning itself as a leader in regional energy transition efforts. Nevertheless, the pace of transformation remains slow, and the ecological health of the gulf continues to deteriorate. Industrial discharges, oil spills, and unregulated coastal development contribute to severe marine ecosystem degradation, affecting biodiversity and fisheries. These environmental stresses underscore the urgent need for coordinated regional governance to balance economic interests with climate resilience and ecological preservation.

#4. The Strait of Malacca: a strategic maritime chokepoint

The Strait of Malacca is one of the most vital and congested maritime corridors in the world. Stretching approximately 800 kilometres in length and narrowing to just 30 kilometres at its narrowest point, it is the shortest sea route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On average, one ship transits the strait every eight minutes, making it the busiest strait in the world.

#A. Economic significance

The Strait of Malacca plays a critical role in global trade and energy flows. It is the shortest maritime route between the Middle East and East Asia, with over two-thirds of the world’s hydrocarbon flows transiting through it. Approximately one-third of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) and half of global maritime trade pass through the strait. Notably, 90 percent of China's maritime trade relies on this passage.

The strait also serves as a key export corridor for manufactured goods produced in Southeast Asia, such as those by major TNCs like Apple, destined for European and East Coast US markets. As such, it is essential to the functioning of global supply chains.

Despite their proximity, Malaysia and Indonesia face economic limitations compared to Singapore, which benefits most from the strait due to its political stability, advanced port infrastructure, and its participation in the SIJORI Growth Triangle. SIJORI is a regional economic partnership between Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the Riau Islands of Indonesia, designed to foster cross-border investment and trade. Malaysia’s ports, Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, rank among the world’s busiest, while Singapore’s port remains a global container hub of major strategic importance.

#B. Geostrategic importance

The strait is a maritime crossroads linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans via the South China Sea. Its location makes it a key axis of globalisation, especially in connecting the three poles of the Triad, North America, Europe, and East Asia. It is often referred to as an oceanic gateway because of its function as a transition point between major oceanic basins.

The strait is managed by its littoral states, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, under the provisions of the UNCLOS (since Montego Bay Convention, in 1982). Among these, Singapore plays a dominant role due to its economic and strategic leverage. Japan has provided financial and technical support to help ensure the safety and management of the strait, reflecting its dependency on secure energy transit.

#C. Challenges and regional governance

Governance of the Strait of Malacca involves both regional cooperation and international assistance. A key concern has been the security of navigation, particularly regarding piracy, which remains a persistent threat. In 2006, around 200 pirate attacks were reported, many based on the Indonesian island of Batam, a known hotspot for illicit maritime activity.

In response, anti-piracy initiatives such as ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) have been developed, supported by regional powers and global maritime actors including the United States, Japan, China, and India.

Beyond piracy, terrorism is an emerging concern. The region, especially islands like Batam, has been linked to radical Islamic networks and has hosted extremist teachings. These dynamics add complexity to the governance of the strait, necessitating both technical and security cooperation among local and international stakeholders to preserve safe and open maritime transit.

#D. The Kra Canal project: an alternative route?

As congestion and vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca continue to raise concerns, Thailand has periodically revived proposals to construct a canal across the Kra Isthmus. It would offer an alternative maritime route between the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. This hypothetical Kra Canal would bypass the Strait of Malacca entirely, potentially reducing transit time and shipping costs for vessels travelling between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The project presents both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, it could ease pressure on the Malacca Strait, generate revenue for Thailand, and provide strategic diversification for countries like China that seek alternatives to chokepoints controlled by other powers. On the other hand, it raises geopolitical tensions, particularly with Singapore and Malaysia, whose economies rely heavily on current maritime traffic. Moreover, the project's high cost, environmental risks, political instability and risk of separatism in southern Thailand have so far prevented its realisation.

The Kra Canal remains a speculative yet symbolically powerful project, highlighting the strategic stakes involved in maritime connectivity and the broader shifts in Asia’s geopolitical maritime landscape.

#5. Submarine cables: geography, significance in globalisation and actors

#A. Global typology of the submarine cable network

The planet is encircled by more than 1.3 million kilometres of submarine cables, an infrastructure 32 times the circumference of the Earth. These cables form the essential skeleton of global digital connectivity, carrying 99 percent of intercontinental data traffic. Their layout reveals a hierarchical and uneven geography, which can be broadly grouped into three zones of connectivity based on density, infrastructure, and integration into global flows.

#a) Hyper-connected core regions

This group includes North America, Western Europe, and parts of East and Southeast Asia. These regions are the most densely wired, forming the digital backbone of global capitalism.

Key global cities like New York, London, Frankfurt, Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong function as major landing points and interconnection hubs, hosting the largest data centres and internet exchange points. The North Atlantic corridor, linking the United States to Europe, remains the busiest and most strategic cable route globally. In Asia, the dense web linking Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan reflects both commercial integration and military sensitivity.

These regions benefit from early infrastructure investment, advanced digital economies, and strong links to the governance of internet protocols and data flows.

#b) Intermediate and emerging connectivity regions

This group includes South America, the Middle East, India, and parts of Oceania. These regions are increasingly integrated into the global digital network but remain dependent on key gateways.

In South America, countries like Brazil and Chile are expanding their connectivity, largely via links to North America and, more recently, direct lines to Europe and Asia. The Middle East, with hubs like Dubai and Abu Dhabi, acts as a bridge between Asia, Europe, and Africa, while also serving military and commercial strategic interests.

India has become a growing hub, with Mumbai and Chennai emerging as cable landing sites of global relevance. Australia and New Zealand are highly dependent on long-haul cables that link them to Southeast Asia and the US, reinforcing their semi-peripheral position despite strong infrastructure.

#c) Peripheral and under-connected regions

Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Central Asia, and smaller island nations fall into this category. Despite increasing investments in cable infrastructure, these regions remain on the margins of global digital flows.

Africa’s coasts, especially around Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, are now more connected, but inland regions remain poorly integrated. Island nations and landlocked countries often depend on regional partnerships or foreign investment, leaving them vulnerable to disconnection or geopolitical leverage.

#B. Strategic importance of submarine cables

Fibre-optic cables are the backbone of global immaterial connectivity. These cables carry vast volumes of information across continents in milliseconds, facilitating everything from personal communication and media streaming to business operations and government services.

Their importance is particularly evident in the financial sector, where the speed and reliability of data transfer are essential. Real-time financial transactions, digital banking services, stock trading, and algorithmic markets all depend on the smooth functioning of these underwater infrastructures. In this context, submarine cables have become indispensable to the digital economy and the operation of global financial systems.

Beyond finance, the strategic value of these cables lies in their support for the global digital infrastructure. They enable the expansion of cloud computing and the development of new digital industries, which increasingly depend on uninterrupted and high-speed international data flows.

Given their critical role, submarine cables have become objects of geopolitical competition, attracting the interest of states and private corporations alike. Their security, ownership, and control raise strategic questions about digital sovereignty, surveillance, and cybersecurity, especially as great powers seek to influence or monitor global information flows.

#C. Submarine cables as a source of cooperation

Despite being the focus of increasing geopolitical rivalry, submarine cables are also a powerful driver of international cooperation, both among private actors and between states. The vast scale and high cost of laying and maintaining these cables have encouraged collaborative efforts across borders and sectors.

In recent years, the rise of major digital corporations, particularly the so-called GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft), has transformed the landscape of cable infrastructure. These companies have moved from being simple users of bandwidth to becoming direct investors and co-owners of submarine cable systems. Collectively, they now finance and control over 50 percent of global cable capacity, often partnering with telecom companies and local operators. Their involvement reduces costs, speeds up deployment, and allows for customised infrastructure to meet their massive data needs.

This trend highlights the geo-economic logic behind cooperation: the price of a single cable system can exceed hundreds of millions of dollars, making unilateral projects unsustainable. As such, multinational cable consortia are now the norm, involving a mix of states, private firms, and regional alliances. This also reflects a geopolitical dimension, as states may support or restrict certain partnerships based on strategic interests and digital sovereignty concerns.

At the intergovernmental level, institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) play a key role in coordinating standards and ensuring global interoperability. The ITU promotes equitable access and cooperation between countries to maintain a secure and harmonised global network.

Additionally, alliances such as the Five Eyes, a security partnership between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, represent the intersection of security and cooperation. Through intelligence-sharing agreements, these countries monitor data flows across cable routes to prevent cyber threats and maintain control over sensitive communications infrastructure.

In sum, while submarine cables are increasingly linked to national power and digital sovereignty, they remain embedded in networks of cooperation that are essential for the functioning of the interconnected global economy.

#D. Submarine cables as a source of conflict

While submarine cables foster cooperation, they are also a growing source of geopolitical tension, particularly in relation to data sovereignty, digital surveillance, and the concentration of power in the hands of a few actors.

Currently, an estimated 80 percent of global internet data traffic transits through infrastructure connected to or passing via the United States. This asymmetry gives the US an unparalleled position in monitoring and controlling data flows, leading to concerns among other countries about their dependence on American networks and the risk of surveillance. The revelations by Edward Snowden in 2013 about US intelligence interception of global communications confirmed the extent of these fears.

In response, some countries have sought to reconfigure their digital geography. For example, Brazil has pursued projects to establish direct submarine cable links with Europe, explicitly bypassing the United States. These initiatives aim to enhance digital autonomy and reduce exposure to foreign surveillance.

Russia, which currently maintains only four submarine cable connections with the rest of the world, has expressed concern about its limited connectivity and vulnerability to Western control. Moscow has advocated for alternative routing systems and has promoted regional digital infrastructure, often tied to state-led narratives of sovereignty and national security.

Another layer of tension stems from the role of Chinese companies, particularly Huawei Marine (HMN Technologies), in the deployment of submarine cables. Western governments have raised security concerns about potential espionage or sabotage, fuelling broader rivalries over who builds, owns, and operates the global cable infrastructure. The strategic suspicion toward Chinese actors reflects wider anxieties about the weaponisation of digital infrastructure in the context of US-China technological competition.

In addition, the dominance of major American technology firms, the GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), in both digital platforms and physical infrastructure raises questions about private monopolisation of global communication systems. These corporations are not only major content providers but also owners of global data highways, allowing them to influence routing, access, and pricing of data transmission, often beyond the regulatory reach of national governments.

In this context, submarine cables have become more than just technical infrastructure, they are now strategic maritime assets, embedded in the seabed yet central to the functioning of the global digital economy. Their placement beneath the oceans transforms maritime space into a crucial vector of geopolitical competition, where control over undersea routes mirrors traditional rivalries over shipping lanes and naval dominance. As such, the oceans are no longer only theatres of trade and military projection, but also critical frontiers in the battle for digital sovereignty and global influence.