2. The Cold War becomes global: China and the impact of multipolarity on international relations, 1949-71

Contents

1. Maoism and ‘Continuous International Revolution’
2. Complex relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union
3. Complex relations between the PRC and the USA

Key issues

Assess China’s impact on the Cold War between 1949-1971
Discuss the changing nature of Sino-Soviet relations after 1949

Key terms

Multipolarity (China and the Cold War)
Maoism (international relations 1949-71)
The Sino-Soviet Split

Discussion points

The Indochinese War and the Geneva Conference
The Bandung Conference
The Moscow Conferences of 1957 and 1961

The Cold War, often viewed through the binary lens of US-Soviet rivalry, was profoundly reshaped by the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. While China did not reach superpower status comparable to the USA or USSR during this period, its assertive foreign policy, ideological framework, and strategic decisions significantly complicated the Cold War's bipolar logic.

Mao Zedong envisioned China as a transformative global actor, championing what he called “Continuous International Revolution.” This ambition aligned with the post-war wave of decolonisation, as China sought to position itself as a leader among newly independent nations, challenging Western imperialism and the Soviet Union’s dominance over the communist bloc. China's influence spanned multiple arenas, from direct involvement in the Korean and Indochinese wars to its leadership in the Bandung Conference and ideological export of Maoism.

The periodisation of this study, 1949 to 1971, captures the PRC’s foundational years and its rise as an international actor, culminating in its inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. By 1971, the Cold War had evolved beyond a purely bipolar struggle between the US and USSR. China’s growing assertiveness contributed to the emergence of a multipolar order, in which global power was more distributed among several key players rather than dominated solely by the two superpowers. This shift not only influenced Cold War diplomacy but also laid the foundation for China’s future economic and political transformation. During these decades, China's foreign policy evolved, reflecting its complex relationships with both the USA and the USSR. From the Sino-Soviet alliance and its eventual split to the early hostility and later rapprochement with the USA, China played a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of the Cold War.

This chapter explores the ideological underpinnings of Maoist foreign policy, China’s strategic interventions in the Third World, and the fluctuating nature of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations. It seeks to assess the extent of China’s impact on the Cold War and how its actions reflected both regional ambitions and broader global transformations.

#1. Maoism and ‘Continuous International Revolution’

#A. Western perception of Mao’s reunification campaigns

#a) Tibet

Western perception of Mao’s intervention in Tibet was largely critical, viewing it as an act of aggression and imperial expansion rather than the “peaceful liberation” claimed by the Chinese government. The PLA (People Liberation Army) entered Tibet in October 1950 under the justification that Tibet had historically belonged to China. Despite spirited resistance from 60,000 Tibetans fighting to preserve their land and culture, their outdated weaponry and lack of a trained army meant they were no match for the modern, well-equipped PLA. Open resistance was crushed within six months, and the PLA imposed a regime of terror to erase Tibetan identity. Over the years, this process of erasure continued, with demographic shifts through Han migration and policies aimed at undermining Tibetan culture and religion. Many in the West saw this as a form of “cultural genocide,” particularly as reports indicated that Lhasa’s Han population eventually surpassed that of Tibetans. However, caught in Cold War geopolitics, Western governments limited their responses to diplomatic condemnations without taking direct action, as their strategic focus lay elsewhere.

#b) Xinjiang and Guangdong

In Xinjiang, Mao faced a significant challenge due to the region's large Muslim population, which the central government feared could fuel separatism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to secure its control through military and political repression, fearing that ethnic separatism could destabilise the region. Mao was also concerned about Soviet influence in Xinjiang, as neighbouring Soviet Central Asia had cultural and political ties to the region. Though the USSR did not directly challenge China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang, Moscow’s support for minority groups elsewhere in Asia heightened Beijing’s suspicions, reinforcing Mao’s belief that Soviet ambitions could threaten China’s territorial integrity. These fears led to strict military and political control over the region, accompanied by efforts to suppress cultural and religious identity.

In Guangdong, Mao had to consolidate power over a historical KMT (Kuomingtang, or Guomingdang) stronghold. The province, particularly Guangzhou, had been a key base for Chiang Kai-shek before his retreat to Taiwan in 1949. The whole province, particularly the city of Guangzhou, witnessed intense repression, with violent bloodletting against 130,000 so-called “criminals and bandits.” This campaign was part of Mao’s broader effort to eradicate any remnants of nationalist opposition and establish absolute control. The purges in Guangdong were part of Mao’s broader efforts to consolidate communist rule by eliminating remaining Kuomintang influence. While Western observers were alarmed by the scale of executions, Cold War priorities meant that foreign governments focused more on containing China’s external influence rather than intervening in its domestic affairs. Instead, criticism remained largely rhetorical, as Western governments focused on countering Soviet influence rather than directly challenging Mao’s consolidation of power.

#c) Taiwan

Mao’s attitude toward Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated in 1949, was uncompromising. He considered the island not a separate state but a province of mainland China under illegal occupation by the Nationalists. Initially, Mao planned to extend the Civil War by launching an immediate invasion of Taiwan to reclaim it, believing that complete reunification was essential to securing the revolution. However, he was ultimately dissuaded by the strength of US-backed Taiwanese resistance, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Western governments viewed Taiwan as a critical frontier in the containment of communism, and the US, fearing a communist expansion in East Asia, intervened decisively. President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, effectively preventing a PLA invasion. This hardened Mao’s position, reinforcing his belief that Taiwan was not only a domestic issue but also a symbol of imperialist interference. For the next two decades, cross-strait tensions remained high, with the PRC periodically bombarding offshore islands controlled by the KMT. The Western perception of Mao’s failure to take Taiwan was largely framed as a victory for containment, ensuring that the PRC remained isolated within the communist bloc while Taiwan, under US protection, developed separately.

#B. Political opportunities offered by decolonisation

#a) Rise against imperialism

China emerged as a key anti-colonial power during the global wave of decolonisation, presenting itself as a leader of the Third World against imperialism. Zhou Enlai played a crucial diplomatic role, earning China admiration and allies by supporting independence movements and offering developmental aid. One of the most notable projects was the construction of the Tanzanian-Zambian railway (TAZARA), agreed upon in 1967, with construction starting in 1970. Built with Chinese funding and technical expertise, it provided a crucial trade route for landlocked Zambia, reducing dependence on white-minority-ruled Southern Africa. In Latin America, China extended its influence by providing subsidies to Castro's Cuba, strengthening ties with revolutionary movements in the region. China’s involvement in anti-colonial struggles often put it at odds with the Soviet Union. In Angola, for example, the PRC supported the FNLA, while the USSR backed the MPLA, creating a Cold War battleground within revolutionary movements. China’s involvement further cemented its reputation as an anti-colonial power.

Despite these aspirations, China ultimately failed to replace the USSR as the leader of the “world revolution.” The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, significantly damaged China’s international standing. The political turmoil within China led to Zhou Enlai's temporary sidelining, disrupting diplomatic engagements. Additionally, China's often rigid and dogmatic foreign policy, coupled with its treatment of ethnic minorities like Tibetans, created diplomatic friction. The perception of arrogance and isolationism among overseas Chinese communities further limited China's ability to exert soft power. While it gained ideological allies, China’s global revolutionary ambitions never translated into the leadership role it had envisioned.

#b) China’s role in the war in Indochina

The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 marked a turning point in the Indochina War, with China playing a key role in supporting the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam) was a communist-led nationalist movement founded in 1941 to fight for Vietnamese independence, first against the Japanese and later against the French. Mao saw the conflict as an opportunity to spread revolution in Asia and weaken Western colonial influence. In response to Ho Chi Minh's requests, China provided vital assistance, including political recognition, military advisers, weapons, and training for Viet Minh soldiers.

China’s involvement in the war helped pave the way for the Geneva Conference in 1954, where the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel with a promise of national elections to determine reunification. Ho Chi Minh's continued push for unification underscored China's diplomatic influence, enhancing its global stature as an anti-imperialist power. However, while China played a crucial role in supporting Vietnam’s struggle against the French, it remained cautious in directly confronting the United States as the conflict escalated into the broader Vietnam War.

#c) China’s role in the Bandung Conference in 1955

The Bandung Conference, held in April 1955 in Indonesia, brought together representatives from 29 Asian and African nations to discuss peace, economic development, and decolonisation. It marked a defining moment for the emerging nonaligned movement, as delegates sought to assert independence from both Cold War superpowers. A key outcome was the endorsement of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality. These principles became central to China's diplomatic positioning.

China, under Zhou Enlai’s leadership, played a prominent role in shaping the conference’s solidarity-building efforts alongside India. The conference strengthened China’s ties with newly independent nations and positioned it as a champion of the Global South. However, despite China’s efforts to build alliances, suspicion remained among some participants due to its domestic policies and its perceived aspirations for ideological dominance.

#C. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on foreign affairs

#a) Attacks on foreign embassies and diplomats

The Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao in 1966, was intended to purge the CCP and PRC of reactionary elements but also had a significant impact on China’s international relations. Lin Biao, Mao’s close ally and the architect of the PLA’s political role, and Mao's cult of personality, was instrumental in spreading Maoist ideology beyond China’s borders. He promoted the Little Red Book as a revolutionary text and championed the idea that China should serve as the vanguard of global revolution. As mass mobilisation intensified, Red Guards, young radical Maoists, targeted not only domestic figures but also foreign diplomats and embassies, seeing them as symbols of imperialist decadence. Eleven foreign embassies, including those of the USSR, the Netherlands, France, India, and Britain, were attacked, with staff members being harassed or assaulted. The Red Guards laid siege to these embassies with little interference from the police, violating international diplomatic norms and the sovereignty of other nations.

Instances of aggression included physical violence, a barrage of insults, and in some cases, the seizure of diplomats. The attacks reflected Mao’s radical push to export revolutionary fervour but severely damaged China’s diplomatic standing. Countries that had been sympathetic to China’s anti-imperialist stance grew wary of its erratic behaviour, contributing to China’s growing isolation in the late 1960s. The Cultural Revolution worsened China’s relations with key non-communist states. In Indonesia, fears of Chinese-backed communist subversion contributed to the brutal anti-communist purge of 1965, which saw hundreds of thousands killed, including many ethnic Chinese. This event led to a diplomatic freeze between China and Indonesia for over a decade. Similarly, China’s ideological radicalism deepened its rivalry with India, as Maoist rhetoric and support for insurgent groups heightened tensions following the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Instead of expanding China’s influence, the Cultural Revolution often alienated potential allies and reinforced China’s international isolation.

#b) Chinese attacks abroad

During the Cultural Revolution, attacks on foreigners extended beyond China, with violent incidents occurring in over 30 countries by 1967. The radicalism encouraged by Beijing led to clashes in several states, particularly in Southeast Asia, where governments reacted harshly against Chinese expatriates. In Burma and Indonesia, anti-Chinese sentiment escalated into violence, with authorities targeting communities that were seen as loyal to the PRC rather than integrating into local society. Beijing encouraged this loyalty by granting overseas Chinese full Chinese citizenship, reinforcing the perception that they were extensions of the Maoist state rather than assimilated minorities.

One of the most striking examples of Chinese aggression abroad occurred in London in August 1967, when staff at the Chinese Embassy emerged armed with sticks and machetes, shouting Mao’s name and threatening police officers. Protected by diplomatic immunity, they were able to demonstrate aggressively without fear of legal consequences. These incidents severely damaged China’s diplomatic relations and reinforced the perception that Maoism was not just a domestic ideology but a destabilising force in international affairs.

#c) Trouble in Hong Kong

Mao sought to use the Cultural Revolution to stir trouble for Britain over its possession of Hong Kong, hoping to undermine British colonial rule without triggering a full-scale military confrontation. In May 1967, he attempted to escalate a workers' strike into an anti-British demonstration, anticipating a heavy-handed police response that would radicalise local sentiment. When Hong Kong’s police did not react as Mao had hoped, he instructed Zhou Enlai to send Chinese-backed terrorists to escalate the violence. The campaign resulted in the assassination of five policemen and over 160 bombings, causing civilian casualties and property destruction.

Despite Mao’s efforts, the Hong Kong authorities managed to contain the unrest without resorting to the kind of massacre he may have anticipated. Mao’s strategy was not aimed at reclaiming Hong Kong immediately but rather at embarrassing Britain and showcasing China’s ability to destabilise colonial rule. He was careful to avoid actions that might force the PRC into prematurely seizing the territory, reflecting a patient and calculated approach to Hong Kong’s eventual return to Chinese control.

#d) Maoism adoption in the West

Though China’s global image had deteriorated due to the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, Maoism still found appeal in the West, particularly as an alternative to Stalinism after the exposure of Stalin’s atrocities. By 1968, Maoism gained traction in both Europe and the USA, aligning with student and worker protests, anti-war movements, and a surge in political violence. Many leftist movements, particularly in France and Italy, were influenced by Mao-Spontex, a term referring to spontaneous, anti-authoritarian movements that rejected rigid Marxist-Leninist doctrine but embraced Maoist revolutionary enthusiasm.

Notable French intellectuals who became Maoists included Jean-Paul Sartre, Alain Badiou, and Philippe Sollers. Sartre, though critical of some aspects of Maoism, supported its revolutionary ideals, while Badiou fully embraced Maoist thought. Sollers and others in the “Gauche Prolétarienne” were also influenced by Maoist ideology.

A key symbol of Maoist influence was the Little Red Book, which was translated into 64 languages and sold in 150 countries, making it one of the most widely distributed books in history, comparable to the Bible. The book’s revolutionary slogans and simplified ideology resonated with activists disillusioned with both capitalism and Soviet communism. However, despite its appeal in radical circles, Maoism’s actual political impact in Western democracies was limited, as its extreme ideological demands alienated many moderate leftists.

#e) Maoism adoption beyond the West

Maoism also influenced armed insurgencies beyond China’s direct control. In South Asia, the Naxalite movement in India and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal were inspired by Mao’s revolutionary tactics, advocating peasant uprisings and prolonged guerrilla warfare. In the Philippines, the Communist Party (CPP) embraced Maoist strategies to fight against the government, leading to a long-standing insurgency that continues in some form today.

#2. Complex relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union

#A. Early difficulties with the Sino-Soviet friendship

#a) Territorial disputes

At the end of the Pacific War in August 1945, Soviet forces occupied Manchuria for nine months, stripping the region of its industrial resources before withdrawing. This action deprived China of over $2 billion worth of plant and machinery, fostering long-term resentment within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the USSR. Although Mao Zedong publicly expressed gratitude for Soviet assistance in the Chinese Civil War, this episode deepened suspicions regarding Soviet intentions in China.

Even after the formation of the PRC in 1949, territorial disputes along the 7,000-kilometre Sino-Soviet border remained a source of tension. Stalin maintained control over key strategic locations, such as Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Dalian, delaying their return to China despite Mao’s repeated requests.

Tensions escalated further in the 1960s, after the Sino-Soviet split had already occurred, when both sides laid claim to islands along the Ussuri River, particularly Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian). In 1969, armed clashes erupted over this disputed territory, marking the most serious military confrontation between the two communist powers.

#b) Ideological differences and national rivalry

Even before the Sino-Soviet split, ideological differences and national rivalry strained relations between China and the USSR. Mao Zedong had a distinctly Sino-centric view of Marxism and was unwilling to let foreign revolutionaries dictate what revolution should mean for China. This put him at odds with the Soviet leadership, which regarded itself as the true interpreter of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin, and later Khrushchev, expected socialist states to follow Moscow’s lead, while Mao viewed China’s revolutionary experience as unique and saw the Soviet model as unsuitable for Chinese conditions. A key distinction was that Soviet Marxism was based on an urban proletarian revolution, whereas Maoism centred on a peasant-led uprising, reflecting China’s largely agrarian society.

Mao also grew increasingly convinced that Soviet actions were motivated more by Russian self-interest than by genuine communist solidarity. The Soviet occupation of Manchuria in 1945 and its extraction of industrial resources reinforced Mao’s suspicions. However, given China’s economic dependence on Soviet aid in the 1950s, Mao had to balance pragmatism with ideology. He could not afford to openly antagonise the USSR but remained wary of Soviet attempts to influence and divide the PRC, ensuring that China maintained a degree of autonomy within the socialist camp. These tensions, rooted in both ideology and national interests, contributed to the eventual rupture between the two powers.

#c) Mao and Stalin: a clash of personalities

Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1950 to negotiate Soviet support for China was a defining moment in the early Sino-Soviet relationship, but it also exposed personal and political differences between Mao and Stalin. Mao was offended by what he perceived as the condescending attitude of the Soviet leadership. Stalin treated Mao as a junior partner rather than an equal, keeping him waiting for extended periods and making little effort to accommodate him beyond official meetings and banquets. Mao was lodged in a guesthouse in the cold suburbs of Moscow, far from the Kremlin, which he took as a deliberate snub. Isolated and frustrated, he reportedly spent much of his time swimming, reading, and waiting for Stalin to grant him an audience. The lack of personalised arrangements during his stay further reinforced Mao’s belief that the Soviets did not respect China as an independent communist power.

Biographers such as Li Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, suggest that Mao and Stalin disliked each other on a personal level due to their conflicting personalities. Stalin was cautious, calculating, and deeply mistrustful, while Mao was bold, ambitious, and eager to assert China’s revolutionary leadership. In The Private Life of Chairman Mao, Li describes how Mao felt humiliated by Stalin’s dismissive treatment during his 1950 visit to Moscow. Despite these tensions, Mao’s primary objective was to secure the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, which provided China with crucial military and economic assistance. Once negotiations were completed, Mao swiftly departed, but his experience in Moscow confirmed his suspicions that the Soviet Union was motivated by self-interest rather than genuine solidarity based on revolutionary ideals. This resentment would later contribute to the widening ideological rift between the two powers.

#B. The PRC’s initial dependence on the Soviet Union and the Korean War

#a) The 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty

In the context of the Cold War, despite early difficulties with the Soviet Union, Mao adopted a "Leaning to One Side" policy (一边倒), aligning China with the USSR. However, Mao’s mistrust of Stalin proved valid, as the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was heavily skewed in favour of the Soviet Union.

While the treaty's wording promised friendship, equality, and economic cooperation, its actual terms reflected Stalin’s determination to exploit China’s dependence. Mao had initially believed the agreement would provide essential Soviet aid at a low cost, but instead, Stalin imposed harsh conditions:

The $300 million Soviet advance was structured as a loan, not a gift, and carried significant interest.
China had to fully fund the presence of 10,000 Soviet advisers, covering all their expenses.
China was forced to transfer the bulk of its gold and silver reserves to the Soviet Union.

Mao accepted these unfavourable terms because China desperately needed Soviet military and industrial support, but the treaty reinforced his belief that Moscow prioritised self-interest over communist solidarity. Later, Nikita Khrushchev would acknowledge the exploitative nature of the treaty, calling it "an insult to the Chinese people" and comparing it to the 19th century unequal treaties imposed on China by Western imperialists.

#b) Isolation in a capitalist world

Mao was deeply frustrated by Soviet exploitation under the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty but had little choice but to endure it due to China’s isolation in a capitalist world. The PRC had no access to Western expertise or aid, forcing Mao to rely on the Soviet Union for economic and technological assistance. Despite his ideological grievances and mistrust of Stalin, Mao understood that China could not yet sustain itself without Soviet support.

Mao’s long-term goal was to achieve economic independence, allowing China to free itself from Soviet influence. However, until that was possible, he had to carefully manage relations with Moscow, ensuring that China received essential resources while maintaining as much autonomy as possible. This delicate balancing act defined much of the early Sino-Soviet relationship, with Mao accepting Soviet demands in the short term while quietly preparing China for a future without reliance on foreign powers.

#c) Mao’s reaction to the Korean War in 1950

Mao initially hesitated to commit China to the Korean War, as he had not been included in the original invasion plan devised by Stalin and Kim Il Sung. However, once North Korea launched its offensive in June 1950, the situation became a fait accompli, and Mao realised that China had little choice but to intervene. The geographical proximity of Korea and China’s fragile position as a newly established communist state meant that Beijing was compelled to follow the Soviet lead in international affairs.

China’s lack of military resources further reinforced its dependence on the Soviet Union. Chinese soldiers fought in Korea largely in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment, as China lacked the industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged war effort on its own. Mao also faced resistance from within the PLA, as many military leaders were reluctant to engage in direct conflict with the United States. To justify the intervention, Mao argued that allowing US forces to take control of Korea would create a direct security threat to China. He warned that an American presence on the Korean Peninsula would give Washington a strategic foothold on China’s border, increasing the risk of future encirclement and invasion.

The decision to enter the Korean War was therefore shaped by both ideological and strategic considerations. While Mao embraced the rhetoric of international communist solidarity, his actions were also driven by a pragmatic need to protect China’s borders. The war reinforced China’s status as a major player in Cold War geopolitics but also deepened its dependence on the Soviet Union at a time when Mao ultimately sought greater autonomy.

#d) Consequences of the Korean War and benefits for Mao

The Korean War ended with the Panmunjom truce in 1953, which was a ceasefire rather than a peace treaty, leaving Korea divided along the 38th parallel and preventing a Communist takeover of the South. The PLA suffered approximately one million casualties, a significant proportion of its forces. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to defending Taiwan and supported its UN membership, effectively blocking the PRC from reclaiming Taiwan by force. The war also placed a strain on China's economy, diverting resources away from domestic development.

Despite these challenges, Mao Zedong used the war to consolidate political and social control, justifying increased repression in the name of national unity. The three years of war strengthened China's resolve to maintain independence in a hostile international environment. Mao could claim that China had made sacrifices for international communism, enhancing its prestige among socialist states. Additionally, China’s ability to engage in sustained combat against the imperialist United States and emerge without outright defeat boosted national pride and confidence in the Communist government.

#C. The Sino-Soviet split

#a) Consequences of Soviet de-Stalinisation

After Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao initially hoped for stronger ties with the USSR. However, his expectations were shattered when Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes in 1956 during the 20th Party Congress. Mao saw this as an attack on authoritarian leadership styles, including his own, and swiftly condemned Soviet de-Stalinisation. At the same time, he was consolidating his own control within China, building a cult of personality with the help of Lin Biao, who promoted Mao’s image as the supreme revolutionary leader. This contrasted sharply with Khrushchev’s rejection of Stalinist-style personal rule, deepening the ideological divide.

Mao became increasingly concerned with political shifts in the Eastern Bloc, where the Soviet Union allowed greater autonomy to its satellite states. Events such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956 reinforced his belief that Soviet "revisionism" was undermining communist control. Meanwhile, Khrushchev pursued a policy of détente with the West, seeking to reduce Cold War tensions through diplomatic engagement and arms control agreements. This was partly driven by the USSR’s need to stabilise its economy, avoid direct conflict with the USA, and prevent nuclear escalation. Mao, however, viewed détente as a betrayal of Marxist principles, believing it signalled a Soviet retreat from the global revolutionary struggle.

In 1957, Khrushchev organised a conference of Communist parties in Moscow to maintain unity, but Mao used it as a platform to criticise Soviet leadership. He rejected the USSR’s moderate approach to the West, urging Moscow to return to strict Marxist-Leninist principles and prioritise the global class struggle over peaceful coexistence with imperialist nations. As Mao positioned himself as the true leader of world communism, tensions between China and the Soviet Union escalated, marking the beginning of an open ideological rift.

#b) Open split and further antagonism

The formal and open Sino-Soviet split deepened in 1958, with tensions emerging at a Moscow meeting and escalating throughout the following decade. The personal differences between Mao and Khrushchev played a key role in deepening hostilities.

In 1958, negotiations over naval cooperation exposed growing divisions. When Khrushchev visited Beijing that year, Mao deliberately sought to humiliate him, arranging uncomfortable accommodations and even holding discussions in a swimming pool, making Khrushchev feel out of place. At the same time, the Chinese leadership grew more vocal in its criticism of the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping accused the USSR of displaying "great nation, great party chauvinism" and betraying the international Communist movement. He even claimed that Soviet technical advisers in China were acting as spies. These accusations reinforced mutual distrust and widened the ideological rift.

Later in 1958, Mao ordered Chinese forces to prepare for an assault on Taiwan without consulting Moscow. The United States responded by preparing for war, but Mao ultimately refrained from launching a full-scale attack. He later blamed the Soviet Union’s lack of support for his decision not to invade, further fuelling tensions. Mao saw Khrushchev’s unwillingness to back Chinese military action as proof that the USSR was abandoning revolutionary struggle in favour of compromise with the West.

By 1961, ideological and political disagreements had led to a complete breakdown in relations. At the Moscow Conference of Communist parties that year, Mao’s representatives, led by Deng Xiaoping, fiercely criticised Soviet policies. The Chinese delegation dramatically marched out of the meeting in protest, symbolising the final rupture between the two nations. Shortly after, Khrushchev denounced Mao as a Trotskyist and condemned the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward, arguing that China’s economic approach was reckless. In response, Mao increasingly portrayed the USSR as a revisionist power that had betrayed the true path of Marxism-Leninism. That same year, the Soviet Union withdrew its economic advisers from China and cancelled commercial contracts, cutting off vital Soviet aid to Chinese development projects. With diplomacy collapsing and economic ties severed, the Sino-Soviet split had become an open and irreversible division.

By the late 1960s, tensions escalated beyond diplomacy into direct military conflict. In 1969, the Zhenbao Island Incident saw armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces along the Ussuri River, with both sides suffering casualties. Some feared this could escalate into full-scale war, especially as the Soviet Union considered a preemptive nuclear strike on China. These events cemented the Sino-Soviet split as not just an ideological conflict but also a military and geopolitical confrontation, pushing China to seek a counterbalance through rapprochement with the United States.

#c) Nonalignment

China had condemned de-Stalinisation, yet it strategically supported anti-Soviet socialist countries to challenge the USSR and assert its own leadership in the communist world. As tensions grew, the PRC retaliated against what it saw as Soviet attempts to undermine its influence by fostering alliances with states that defied Moscow.

Albania became a key example of this strategy. Albania rejected Soviet leadership and instead recognised China as the true vanguard of the international revolutionary movement. In response to Albania’s defiance, the Soviet Union withdrew financial aid from the country in 1961 and expelled it from the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the Soviet-led economic organisation of socialist states. This move was intended to isolate Albania economically and pressure it into compliance.

China quickly stepped in, providing Albania with money and technical assistance to counterbalance Soviet pressure. Over time, Albania became a de facto Chinese satellite state, aligning itself closely with Beijing’s ideological positions and foreign policy. Despite Albania’s relatively minor geopolitical significance, Mao saw its support as symbolically important in the broader struggle against Soviet "revisionism." The Chinese backing of Albania demonstrated Beijing’s commitment to opposing Moscow’s dominance and signalled the PRC’s ambition to lead a revolutionary alternative within the socialist world.

#d) Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and rivalry over international leadership of communism

The Sino-Soviet split had developed gradually, with key turning points marking its escalation from ideological disputes to open hostility:

1956 – Mao rejected Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation and policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, viewing them as betrayals of revolutionary principles. The Hungarian Uprising reinforced his belief that Soviet "revisionism" was weakening communism.
1957 – At the Moscow Conference of Communist parties, Mao criticised the USSR’s accommodating stance towards the West and positioned China as a leader of global revolution. While tensions were evident, open conflict was avoided.
1958 – Personal rivalry worsened relations. During Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing, Mao humiliated him, while Deng Xiaoping accused the USSR of "great nation, great party chauvinism." Mao’s unilateral military actions, such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, further strained ties when the Soviets refused to support him.
1961 – At the Moscow Conference of this year, China openly attacked Soviet policies. The Chinese delegation walked out, and soon after, the USSR withdrew its economic advisers and cut aid to China, making the split irreversible. The rivalry extended to global communist leadership. The Soviet Union withdrew financial aid from Albania due to its defiance, and China stepped in to support it. Mao denounced the USSR as "new Russian tsars" and "social fascists," while Khrushchev labelled Mao an "Asian Hitler."

From 1962, tensions continued to escalate as Mao condemned Soviet foreign policy. The Cuban Missile Crisis convinced him that Khrushchev was weak and unwilling to stand up to the United States, reinforcing China’s belief that the USSR had abandoned revolutionary struggle. The signing of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the USSR, the USA, and the UK deepened the divide, as China saw it as another Soviet betrayal that restricted the nuclear ambitions of developing socialist nations.

China was also bitter over the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of advisers in 1960, which had left its nuclear programme struggling. Determined to assert independence, China accelerated its efforts and successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1964, followed by a hydrogen bomb in 1967. This rapid nuclear advancement demonstrated China’s defiance of Soviet influence and strengthened its claim to be the true revolutionary power, willing to challenge both the United States and the USSR.

The conflict over communist leadership reached new heights in 1968 when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified intervention to suppress political liberalisation within socialist states. Mao condemned this as proof of Soviet imperialism, portraying China as the true defender of global revolution. By the late 1960s, the split was complete. What had begun as ideological disputes had transformed into an open geopolitical rivalry, fracturing the communist world and reshaping Cold War dynamics.

#3. Complex relations between the PRC and the USA

#A. Tensions in the 1950s and 1960s

#a) The ‘loss’ of China and American containment policies

The establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was seen by the United States as a major setback in the Cold War. The "loss" of China to communism led to accusations in the US that weak foreign policy had allowed Mao to seize power. This perception shaped American policy towards China for the following decades, with Washington refusing to recognise the PRC and working to isolate it diplomatically and economically. Much like the ‘Iron Curtain’ in Europe, which symbolised the division between NATO-aligned Western Europe and the Soviet bloc, the ‘Bamboo Curtain’ represented the Cold War divide in Asia. However, while the US countered the USSR in Europe through NATO and the Marshall Plan, containment in Asia took a different form, relying on alliances and bilateral defense treaties with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Unlike Europe, where the US had a military presence directly bordering Soviet-controlled states, China’s isolation was reinforced more through diplomatic and economic means, as the US blocked its entry into the UN and imposed strict trade restrictions.

American fears of a more assertive China, combined with growing Sino-Soviet hostility, set the stage for a gradual reassessment of US-China relations in the following decade.

#b) Key flashpoints: Taiwan, Tibet, and the Korean War

The early years of the People's Republic of China (PRC) were marked by several key flashpoints that heightened tensions between China and the United States, reinforcing their Cold War hostility.

In Korea, the outbreak of war in 1950 brought the PRC and the US into direct military confrontation. When US-led UN forces pushed into North Korea, China saw this as a threat to its security and intervened, sending hundreds of thousands of troops across the Yalu River. The fierce fighting that followed deepened American hostility towards China, leading to economic sanctions and China’s diplomatic isolation. The war ended in a stalemate in 1953, but the US remained committed to containing Chinese influence in the region.

In Tibet, the PRC consolidated control following its military intervention in 1950, leading to rising unrest. The Tibetan uprising of 1959, which was violently suppressed by Chinese forces, drew condemnation from the US, which provided covert support to Tibetan resistance groups. Although Washington never formally challenged China’s sovereignty over Tibet, its involvement added another layer of distrust to US-China relations.

In Taiwan, tensions flared during the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55 and 1958), when the PRC shelled Nationalist-held islands. The US responded with military support for the Nationalists, reinforcing its commitment to containing China. These crises brought the US and China to the brink of war, but American nuclear deterrence and diplomatic manoeuvres prevented full-scale conflict.

Each of these flashpoints reinforced the Cold War divide, with China and the US seeing each other as major threats to their respective security and ideological influence. These tensions would shape their relationship for decades to come.

#c) The PRC’s isolation and the nuclear issue

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek maintained that the Republic of China (ROC) was the legitimate government of all China, a position supported by the United States, which blocked PRC recognition in the UN. The US imposed economic sanctions, blocked China’s entry into the United Nations, and reinforced the "Bamboo Curtain" to contain its expansion. However, Mao Zedong dismissed American threats, famously calling the US a "paper tiger", powerful in appearance but weak in reality. He believed that revolutionary spirit and mass mobilisation could overcome superior Western technology, summarised in the phrase "millet plus rifles," which reflected the idea that sheer numbers and determination were more important than advanced weaponry.

Despite this rhetoric, China was determined to break its military dependence on the Soviet Union, especially after the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Mao saw nuclear weapons as essential for securing China’s status as a global power and countering both American and Soviet threats. In 1964, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb, followed by a hydrogen bomb in 1967. These developments alarmed the US, which had previously considered using nuclear threats to deter China. The PRC’s nuclear capability, combined with its growing confidence in challenging both superpowers, set the stage for a shift in global Cold War dynamics and a future reassessment of US-China relations.

#B. From hostility to rapprochement

#a) Shifts in global strategy: the Sino-Soviet split and US opportunism

By the late 1960s, shifts in global strategy created new opportunities for the United States and China to reassess their hostile relationship. The deepening Sino-Soviet split transformed the Cold War dynamic, as China and the Soviet Union became open rivals rather than allies. Border clashes between the two in 1969 heightened tensions, convincing Mao that the USSR, rather than the US, posed the greatest immediate threat to China. This shift opened the door for potential diplomatic manoeuvres with Washington.

The United States, under President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, recognised this opportunity and sought to exploit the division between the communist giants. Nixon, who had previously been staunchly anti-communist, saw engaging China as a way to gain leverage over the Soviet Union and reduce Cold War tensions. The Vietnam War also played a role in this strategic shift, as the US hoped that improved relations with China could help pressure North Vietnam into negotiations.

For China, rapprochement with the US offered strategic benefits as well. Facing increasing hostility from the USSR, Mao saw a potential opening to counterbalance Soviet aggression by engaging with Washington. Although ideological differences remained, pragmatism began to shape both sides’ foreign policy, laying the groundwork for a historic shift in US-China relations.

#b) The road to diplomacy: UN representation and early talks

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a gradual shift from hostility to diplomacy between the United States and China. As tensions with the Soviet Union escalated, Mao became more open to engagement with Washington, while the US, under Nixon, saw China as a potential counterweight to Soviet power.

A key turning point came with the question of China’s representation in the United Nations. Since 1949, the US had successfully blocked the People's Republic of China (PRC) from taking China’s seat at the UN, which remained occupied by the exiled Nationalist government in Taiwan. However, by the early 1970s, growing international support for the PRC made this position increasingly untenable. A significant moment came in 1964 when French President Charles de Gaulle officially recognised the PRC, breaking with US policy and encouraging other Western nations to reconsider their stance. While most US allies hesitated to follow immediately, France’s recognition foreshadowed the growing international momentum that would eventually lead to China’s admission to the United Nations in 1971 as the legitimate representative of China, expelling Taiwan. This was a major diplomatic victory for Beijing and marked a shift in global recognition of its legitimacy.

While political leaders conducted secret diplomatic negotiations, sports also played an unexpected role in opening US-China relations. In April 1971, the Chinese government invited the US table tennis team to visit China, marking the first official American delegation in over two decades. This event, later known as "Ping Pong Diplomacy," helped soften public perceptions on both sides and paved the way for more formal diplomatic engagement. In the United States, reactions were mixed. Shortly after, Henry Kissinger made a covert trip to China, preparing the ground for President Nixon’s historic visit in 1972, where he met with Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. While full normalisation of relations would take several more years, these early talks signalled a fundamental shift in US-China relations, breaking two decades of isolation and setting the stage for future cooperation.

#c) Nixon’s visit to Beijing and its significance

In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Beijing, becoming the first American president to set foot in the People's Republic of China (PRC). His meeting with Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai marked a turning point in US-China relations, breaking over two decades of diplomatic isolation. The visit was the result of careful secret negotiations, including Henry Kissinger’s covert trips to China in 1971, and was facilitated by earlier gestures such as Ping Pong Diplomacy.

The visit had profound geopolitical significance. For the United States, improving ties with China provided leverage against the Soviet Union, strengthening Nixon’s broader Cold War strategy. For China, rapprochement with the US offered a counterbalance to the growing Soviet threat, as tensions with Moscow had escalated to border clashes in 1969. While full diplomatic normalisation would take several more years, Nixon’s visit symbolised a strategic realignment in the Cold War.

#d) Strategic goals: balancing against the Soviet Union

The rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 1970s was driven by strategic considerations, with both sides seeking to counterbalance the growing power of the Soviet Union. By this time, the Sino-Soviet split had escalated into open hostility, with border clashes in 1969 reinforcing Beijing’s fears of Soviet aggression. Mao saw engagement with the US as a way to strengthen China’s position against the USSR, using Washington as a counterweight to deter Soviet threats.

For the United States, Nixon’s administration recognised that improved ties with China would put pressure on the Soviet Union, forcing Moscow to negotiate more favourable arms control agreements and ease Cold War tensions. The US sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry to its advantage, ensuring that the communist world remained divided. This strategy played a key role in the broader policy of détente, as seen in Nixon’s subsequent negotiations with the USSR, including the signing of the SALT I arms control treaty in 1972.

Although ideological differences between the US and China remained, their shared interest in containing Soviet influence created the foundation for a pragmatic partnership. The realignment of Cold War alliances following Nixon’s visit to Beijing demonstrated how geopolitical strategy could override ideological hostility, reshaping the global balance of power.

#C. Long-term impact on the Cold War

#a) Implications for the bipolar world order

The US-China rapprochement in the 1970s had profound implications for the Cold War and the broader global order. Previously, the Cold War had been defined by a bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the deepening Sino-Soviet split and Washington’s engagement with Beijing created a more complex geopolitical landscape. Instead of a clear US-Soviet confrontation, the world now saw a triangular balance of power, with China emerging as an independent force between the two superpowers.

For the Soviet Union, the US-China relationship was a major strategic setback. Faced with hostility from both Washington and Beijing, Moscow was forced to divert more military resources to its long border with China while also reconsidering its approach to the US. This pressure contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to enter détente and arms control negotiations.

For the United States, breaking China out of its isolation strengthened Washington’s hand in Cold War diplomacy. It created leverage over the Soviet Union while also opening new opportunities for trade and diplomacy in Asia. Meanwhile, for China, the shift allowed Beijing to assert itself as a major global player, gaining international legitimacy while maintaining independence from both superpowers. Ultimately, US-China rapprochement helped transform the Cold War from a rigid bipolar conflict into a more fluid and unpredictable global struggle.

#b) Economic and political openings for the PRC

The rapprochement created significant economic and political opportunities for the PRC, helping it break out of decades of diplomatic isolation. Recognition by the United States encouraged other Western nations to engage with China, leading to increased diplomatic ties and foreign trade. This shift was crucial for Beijing, which sought to modernise its economy after years of self-reliance and the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution.

Politically, improved US-China relations strengthened Beijing’s position on the global stage. The PRC’s admission to the United Nations in 1971, replacing Taiwan, was a key milestone in its growing legitimacy. Trade and diplomatic exchanges with Western nations expanded, allowing China to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and position itself as an independent force in global politics.

Economically, engagement with the West laid the groundwork for China’s eventual shift towards market reforms. Although full-scale economic liberalisation would not begin until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978, the thaw in US-China relations helped China access foreign technology, expertise, and trade opportunities. This period marked the beginning of China’s integration into the global economy, setting the stage for its future economic rise.