Conclusion - China, conquering the frontiers of space, seas and oceans
How does China's strategy of assertion in new frontiers disrupt the global economy and geopolitics?
#1. The political will to assert power through speeches, investments and appropriation
Since its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has pursued a policy of asserting its power over the oceans and in space. To achieve this, it follows a three-step strategy that has evolved over time: theory (speeches), means (investments), and outcomes (appropriations).
#A. 1956-1986: limited investments but sovereignty and power consolidation
#a) Political context from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping
The PRC was founded in 1949 with Mao's victory over the Guomindang, the nationalists fled to Taiwan. In 1949, the PRC was a poor and isolated country, recognised only by Eastern Bloc countries. Initially aligning with the Soviet Union, they separated in the mid-1950s. From then on, the PRC sought to lead the “non-aligned countries” and become a leader of the Third World.
In the 1970s, the PRC drew closer to the USA and became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Mao passed away in 1976, and Deng Xiaoping succeeded him in 1978. In the 19th century, China had declines, allowing foreign powers (Europe, Japan) to take advantage. This led to a strong sense of humiliation and nationalism in the country: Mao aimed to restore China's status as a major power, a goal continued by Deng his successors.
#b) Space: some speeches, limited investments, limited achievements
In space exploration, China's efforts were marked by rhetoric, yet hampered by limited investments and modest achievements.
In 1956, the establishment of the 5th Academy of the Ministry of Defense (today CASIC) signalled the inception of China's space program, driven by the aspirations of the Great Leap Forward. However, financial constraints restricted the scale of investments, resulting in the construction of only the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, with technological support from the USSR. Despite these limitations, China celebrated notable milestones, such as becoming the fifth nation capable of launching satellites into orbit using indigenous technology in 1970.
This era reflects China's quest for autonomy and distinction from dominant superpowers, alongside the ideological narrative embedded within space exploration. Symbolic names like “The East is Red” (Dong Fang Hong 1) for the first satellite and “Long March” (Changzheng 1, or CZ-1) for the rocket family underscore the ideological significance attached to these technological advancements.
#c) Oceans: assertive speeches, limited investments and limited willingness for appropriation
The rhetoric was evident in the declaration made by the PRC during the first UN Conference on the Sea in 1958, where it claimed territorial seas extending from both mainland and island territories, including Taiwan, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands.
However, due to being a poor country, investments were restricted, with the navy primarily tasked with coastal defense due to insufficient resources for broader operations.
The PRC's limited desire for appropriation reflects its historical strategy, inherited from imperial China, which did not prioritise naval power. Instead, the oceans were seen as a protective buffer zone, without ambitions for maritime empire-building.
#B. 1986-2016: more power assertion
#a) Political context from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping
From 1986 to 2016, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping from 1978, China underwent significant changes:
Economically, there was an embrace of economic openness, with the acceptance of capitalist principles and foreign investments, as encapsulated in Deng's famous saying, “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” Enrichment was seen as essential for the Party to maintain power, as reflected in the slogan, “To get rich is glorious.”
China joined the WTO in 1991.
Militarily, there was a push for modernisation and a shift from a discourse of “peaceful coexistence” with neighbouring countries to one of asserting power.
The next leaders were Jiang Zemin, Hu jintao and from 2013, Xi Jinping.
#b) Space: assertive rhetoric and growing investments, significant achievements
There was a notable increase in both rhetoric and investments which positioned China as the third major power capable of human spaceflight.
China capitalised on the collapse of the USSR while its economy was experiencing rapid growth, providing significant financial resources. This allowed China to access Soviet technology at a lower cost (such as purchasing a Soyuz spacecraft) and engage in agreements with the USSR, including training future taikonauts at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in Moscow.
In 1986, the 863 Program set objectives for manned spaceflight and a space station. This vision materialised with subsequent Shenzhou missions: in 2003, Shenzhou 5 marked China's achievement as the third country capable of human spaceflight and was a milestone for Chinese science, technology, and nationalism. Shenzhou, the spacecraft name in Chinese, means “the Divine vessel on the Heavenly River”.
In 1993, the China National Space Administration (CNSA) was established. In 2011, the first prototype of the Chinese space station, Tiangong 1, was launched.
#c) Oceans: shift in speeches and strategy, extraordinary investments, and the onset of regional appropriations
From 1986, the speeches 1986 signified a shift in naval strategy, with coastal defense being replaced by offshore defense, focusing on the “active defense of nearby seas” along the “first line of defense” from Japan to the Philippines and the South of the South China Sea. This was aimed at deterring any potential US aggression and safeguarding the country's commercial interests in a context of openness to globalisation.
Massive investments in the navy began in the 1990s to catch up with the lag, resulting in it becoming the third-largest navy by 2008, with tonnage increasing from 100,000 to 847,000.
These investments facilitated territorial appropriations, such as the occupation of the Spratly Islands in the 1980s, which led to the deaths of at least 140 Vietnamese soldiers.
#C. Since 2016: asserting power at a global scale
#a) Political context since 2016
Xi Jinping has been the sole leader of China since 2013, consolidating power and establishing himself as the President for life by removing the two-term limit in 2022.
Xi Jinping continues China's assertion of power, epitomised by his slogan, the “Chinese Dream,” envisioning China as the leading global power by 2049, year coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.
To achieve this goal, Xi has made massive investments across various domains, including the military, space exploration, infrastructure development, and soft power initiatives through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
#b) Space: speeches are backed by actual significant investments, positioning China as the third space power
The Chinese government's rhetoric is matched by escalating investments, positioning China as a pioneering force in space exploration. For example, an $8 billion budget, primarily directed by the military, underscores China's commitment to this endeavor.
This discourse is substantiated by tangible achievements. The 2016 White Paper on Space Activities outlines China's lunar and Martian ambitions, signaling its intent to become the leading space power by 2049, a goal referred to as the "Space Dream."
China's space program has already achieved significant milestones:
- China has achieved autonomy in various space technologies, including launch vehicles, spacecraft, satellites, and space stations.
- In 2019, China's Chang'e 4 probe successfully explored the far side of the Moon, collecting samples of lunar soil, marking an unprecedented feat in space exploration.
- In 2021, China's Zhurong rover robot landed on Mars, symbolically named after the Chinese god of fire.
- The Chinese space station Tiangong (“Heavenly Palace”) became operational in 2022, filling the void left by China's exclusion from the International Space Station (ISS) since 2011.
- China aims to establish a lunar base inhabited by robots and eventually by humans by 2030.
- China has surpassed both the USA and Russia in space launches since 2011, with a significant increase between 2019 and 2021.
These achievements have fuelled China's aspirations for territorial appropriations in space, including plans to exploit lunar resources such as uranium and water from polar regions on the Moon.
Furthermore, China's space program has civilian and military applications, including a network of 30 satellites covering the global space domain under the Beidou navigation system.
Adopting a strategy similar to NASA's New Space initiative, China aims to commence space tourism by 2025, aligning with its broader ambitions in space exploration and utilisation.
#c) Oceans: global aspirations backed by extroardinary investments led to more appropriation
China's ambitions in ocean governance have evolved into a global agenda, marked by substantial investments and territorial acquisitions on both regional and global scales.
On the global front, China's ambitions are substantiated by significant investments in its navy, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as outlined in the 2016 White Paper on Military Strategy. For instance, China's rapid naval expansion is illustrated by the construction of a naval fleet equivalent to that of France's every four years. China surpassed the USA in both the number of vessels and tonnage since 2020, effectively boasting the world's largest naval force, albeit with the USA maintaining technological superiority.
Furthermore, China's maritime strategy of assertion and appropriation operates through two key avenues:
- Militarisation in the “ten-dash line” (former “nine-dash-line”) since 2013: This strategy aims at regional assertion and appropriation. Appropriations, previously limited to islets in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, now extend throughout the entire South China Sea. These appropriations take the form of a “Great Wall of Sand,” a term coined by US Pacific Fleet commander Harry Harris, representing the militarisation of islands through the construction of airstrips, ports, military installations, and missile batteries. China seeks to establish sovereignty over the “ten-dash line” through a strategy of fait accompli, despite opposition from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
- Maritime component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI aims to connect China with the rest of the world through land and maritime routes. This initiative involves extensive investments and loans for the construction and management of ports, serving as both civilian and military footholds. Examples include the port of Piraeus in Greece and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, both under Chinese concession for 99 years.
These endeavours reflect China's proactive approach in shaping global maritime dynamics, with implications not only for its own strategic interests but also for the broader geopolitical landscape.
#2. Significant economic and geopolitical implications for China and the world
While China had previously pursued globalisation with discreet diplomacy since the late 1970s, its recent assertion in space and oceans marks a significant departure. It now leverages these domains as instruments of power, shaking global geopolitics with its capacity for both imposition and resistance. Consequently, China's assertion poses economic and geopolitical implications for the world.
#A. Space expansion as a driver of power and global equilibrium disruption
#a) Economic development and sovereignty assertion
China primarily seeks to foster economic development by accessing new resources and asserting sovereignty. This is exemplified by its satellite navigation system, Beidu, established in 2012, which is crucial for independent information access during conflicts.
#b) Challenges to traditonal powers
However, China's achievements require adjustments from other States, particularly traditional powers like the USA, European countries, and Russia. Economically, China's Long March launcher series, renowned for cost-effectiveness, has propelled it to satellite launch leadership since 2018. This development challenges Europe, prompting initiatives like the ESA's Ariane 6 launcher, which is 40% cheaper than its predecessor, Ariane 5.
Geopolitically, China's comprehensive space arsenal poses a direct challenge to US dominance. With capabilities to neutralise military satellites, China undermines the USA's strategic advantages.
#B. Maritime expansion as a driver of power and global equilibrium disruption
#a) BRI deemed crucial for maintaining economic and geopolitical sovereignty
The BRI enables China to diversify its economic partners, particularly in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, to ensure the security of its imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods. Notably, China, reliant on imports for 73% of its oil needs, has become the world's leading importer of hydrocarbons.
Geopolitically, maritime expansion secures strategic footholds, as seen in China's establishment of military bases known as the “String of Pearls,” exemplified by the Djibouti military base since 2017.
#b) China's increasing involvement in the international organisations
This involvement aims at amplifying its influence.
It provides the largest contingent of peacekeeping troops (blue helmets) among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly in Africa. Additionally, China ranks as the second-largest financial contributor to the WHO and UN peacekeeping operations, representing 15% of the budget.
Moreover, Chinese nationals hold prominent leadership positions across major international organisations, outnumbering any other country by threefold, including critical roles in UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Telecommunication Union.
China's initiation of parallel international organisations, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), underscores its growing global influence. This development enhances China's ability to shape or obstruct the UN, garnering increasing allies in the process.
#c) A newfound provoking centrality in global affairs?
Traditional powers perceive China's advancements as encroachments on maritime freedom of navigation.
Similarly, developing countries, reliant on Chinese investment through the BRI, perceive China both as a model for development and as a potential threat due to the debt-trap diplomacy phenomenon. Sri Lanka's lease of the Hambantota port in 2017 exemplifies this dynamic, wherein debt restructuring was exchanged for port concessions.
China's capabilities, as articulated by Serge Sur, i.e., the ability to act, influence others, prevent actions, and obstruct demands, signal a major change from its previous low-profile approach, marking the onset of a global leadership struggle.